Review of Clinton's Asia Trip

One of the more interesting features of Clinton's diplomacy is the lack of the typical diplomatic candor the world has come to expect from the State Department. She spoke very bluntly about the possibility of a succession crisis in North Korea. Typically eulogizing about a dictator is supposed to come after his fall. Many observers have commented that such comments put North Korea in a difficult position to save face.

However, I don't think those comments were for the North Korean leadership, but for the South Korean public. Clinton made her trip to Seoul in order to shore up Washington-Seoul relations. She will allow her minions (Stephen Bosworth, particularly) to figure out the future of Washington-Pyongyang relations.

Clinton's comments were a subtle message to The 2MB administration (Lee-Myung-Bak for those less frequent Korea observers), or more importantly, to those questions whether Lee and Obama would get along. Where the nuclear issue has been the main focus, Clinton tipped her hat to the fact that South Korean's need to be realistic about the future of North Korea.

Writing several days before Clinton's arrival, Lee Byong-chul, a senior fellow at a nonpartisan policy advisory body based in Seoul, commented in the Korea Times that, "Obama needs to tell Kim Jong-il, 67, to forget India and focus on the threat from within over power succession."

B.C. Lee probably imagined a less direct message, the message should have been clear to the Korean populace: the Obama administration backs President Lee's sensible approach to North Korea. Such a conclusion is even more clear with the loud squeal that came from the ultra-left Hankyoreh newspaper. If being more realistic about North Korean issues is important, then the October 4 Declaration or June 15th Joint Statement (in unification-speak meaning unconditional flow of money to North Korea) mean very little to the new administration.